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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
In these consolidated appeals, we consider whether the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) 
prohibits investors from bringing individual actions under 
state law if they exercise their constitutionally protected right 
to opt out of a class action.  Hewing to SLUSA’s text, we 
conclude that these opt-out suits and the class actions from 
which these plaintiffs excluded themselves were not “joined, 
consolidated, or otherwise proceed[ing] as a single action for 
any purpose.”  15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II).  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the District Court’s dismissal of these suits 
and remand for further proceedings. 
I. Background  
This long-running dispute concerns allegations that 
two pharmaceutical manufacturers, Merck and Schering-
Plough, stalled the release of damaging clinical trial results 
for their blockbuster drugs Vytorin and Zetia for years, tried 




results, and then concealed their role in pushing for the 
change.1  During this time, Merck and Schering-Plough 
allegedly made numerous statements touting the efficacy and 
commercial viability of Vytorin and Zetia.    Plaintiffs allege 
that the delay allowed Schering-Plough to raise $4.08 billion 
through a public offering in August 2007, which the company 
then used to purchase another pharmaceutical company that 
would lessen its reliance on Vytorin and Zetia.   
Amid several critical press reports and an incipient 
congressional investigation, Merck and Schering-Plough 
finally released the clinical trial results in January and March 
2008.  The data showed that “[i]n no subgroup, in no 
segment, was there any added benefit” from taking Vytorin, 
raising the possibility that the active-ingredient ezetimibe 
amounted to an “expensive placebo.”  App. 165–66.  Based 
on the results, the New England Journal of Medicine, along 
with several leading cardiologists, recommended that doctors 
prescribe Vytorin and Zetia only if other classes of drugs 
failed to control a patient’s cholesterol.   
The devastating results for these popular anti-
cholesterol drugs allegedly caused Merck’s and Schering-
Plough’s stock price to plummet.  Between December 11, 
2007 and March 31, 2008, Schering-Plough’s common-stock 
price declined 52%, eliminating $23.63 billion in market 
                                              
1 Vytorin and Zetia are anti-cholesterol drugs that 
operate differently than the leading treatment for high 
cholesterol, a class of drugs called statins.  Statins reduce the 
synthesis of low-density lipoprotein in the liver, while Zetia 
inhibits the absorption of cholesterol in the small intestines.  
Vytorin combines Zetia with a statin manufactured by Merck 




capitalization.  And Merck’s stock price dropped 38%, 
amounting to around a $48 billion loss in market 
capitalization.   
A. Investors File Putative Class Actions Against 
Merck and Schering-Plough  
Faced with enormous losses, investors soon filed 
separate putative class actions in the District of New Jersey 
against Merck and Schering-Plough, alleging each made 
numerous material misrepresentations about Vytorin and 
Zetia.  Over a year later, in September 2009, the District 
Court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s (PSLRA) 
heightened pleading standard.  Three years after that, the 
District Court denied defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment and granted class certification.  
The District Court then directed—as Rule 23(c)(2) 
requires—that investors receive notice of their right to opt out 
of the class actions.  The court-approved notices provided 
investors with 45 days (that is, until March 1, 2013) to 
exclude themselves from the class actions.  If they did so, the 
notices assured them, “you will not be bound by any 
judgment in this Action” and “will retain any right you have 
to individually pursue any legal rights that you have against 
any Defendants.”  In re Merck & Co., Inc. Vytorin/ZETIA 
Sec. Litig., No. 2:08-cv-02177, ECF No. 266–1 at 11 (Dec. 
19, 2012); In re Schering-Plough Corp. / ENHANCE Sec. 
Litig., No. 2:08-cv-00397, ECF No. 331–1 at 11 (Dec. 19, 
2012). 
After the opt-out period ended, the District Court 




reached with Merck and Schering-Plough.  At the parties’ 
request, the District Court declined to provide class members 
with a second opportunity to opt out, but did offer opt-out 
investors 45 days to join the class actions and share in the 
recovery.  In preliminarily approving the settlement 
agreements, the District Court reiterated that opt-outs “shall 
not be bound by the terms of the Settlement, the Stipulation, 
or any other orders or judgments in the Action.”  In re 
Schering-Plough Corp. / ENHANCE Sec. Litig., Case No. 
2:08-cv-00397, ECF No. 421 ¶ 11 (June 7, 2013); In re Merck 
& Co., Inc. Vytorin/ZETIA Sec. Litig., Case No. 2:08-cv-
02177, ECF 330 ¶ 11 (June 7, 2013).  In October 2013, the 
District Court gave final approval to the class-action 
settlements and entered separate final judgments dismissing 
class members’ claims with prejudice.   
B. Opt-Out Investors Then File These 
Individual Lawsuits 
The sixteen plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals fell 
within the class definition alleged and eventually certified in 
the class actions against Merck and Schering-Plough.  But 
they were not named plaintiffs, and neither they nor their 
counsel participated in the class-action proceedings.  After the 
District Court certified the class actions, they opted out on the 
last day, March 1, 2013, and declined to opt in to participate 
in the settlement agreements.   
In November 2013 and January 2014, after the District 
Court entered the final judgments in the class-action suits, 
these opt-out investors (“Plaintiffs”) brought their own 
actions against Merck and Schering-Plough, which had since 
merged.  Their complaints track, sometimes verbatim, those 




under New Jersey common law.  Along with their complaints, 
Plaintiffs identified the class-action suits as “related” on the 
civil cover sheet and in a certification, as required by that 
District’s Local Rules.  See D.N.J. L. Civ. R. 5.1(e), 11.2, 
40.1(c).  In briefing papers before the District Court, 
Plaintiffs asserted in connection with an unrelated argument 
that “Defendants have already engaged in lengthy and 
expensive discovery in the class cases,” so their suits would 
not burden defendants.  App. 966.  But nothing suggests that 
Plaintiffs coordinated their lawsuits with the class actions or 
received access to confidential materials therefrom. 
In their first motion to dismiss, Merck did not suggest 
that SLUSA precluded Plaintiffs’ claims, even though that 
posed a threshold jurisdictional issue.  See In re Lord Abbett 
Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Instead, Merck contended that their federal claims were 
barred by the Securities Exchange Act’s statute of repose and 
that their state-law claims failed to plausibly allege actual 
reliance.  The District Court rejected both arguments, but in 
an interlocutory appeal, we reversed the District Court’s 
allowance of Plaintiffs’ federal claims after the Supreme 
Court held that American Pipe tolling does not extend to 
statutes of repose.  See N. Sound Capital LLC v. Merck & Co. 
Inc., 702 F. App’x 75, 81 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Cal. Pub. 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017).  
Our decision left Plaintiffs with only their state-law fraud 
claims. 
On remand, Merck again moved for dismissal of 
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, arguing for the first time that 
SLUSA precluded them because the class actions and the opt-
out suits were “joined, consolidated, or otherwise 




§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II).2  In its opinion, the District Court 
recognized that Merck’s argument “tests the limits of 
SLUSA’s preclusive scope” and “it does not appear that any 
prior decision has addressed this issue.”  N. Sound Capital 
LLC v. Merck & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 589, 601, 615 (D.N.J. 
2018).  Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that 
Plaintiffs’ claims were barred under SLUSA because the 
“Individual Actions and the Vytorin Class Actions have 
proceeded as a single action.”  Id. at 619.  Considering the 
statutory text, the District Court inferred that because 
Congress did not explicitly exempt opt-out suits from 
SLUSA, it necessarily “envisioned the aggregation of opt-out 
suits with related class actions” under SLUSA’s mass-action 
provision.  Id. at 605, 611.  The District Court also concluded 
that SLUSA’s legislative history required it to “construe the 
definition of a ‘covered class action’ broadly.”  Id. at 606 
(citation omitted).  And it relied on several district court 
decisions that, building upon each other, have espoused 
increasingly capacious interpretations of the mass-action 
provision.  Id. at 606–19. 
These appeals followed. 
                                              
 2 The full provision states that a “covered class action” 
is: “(ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same 
court and involving common questions of law or fact, in 
which— (I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 
persons; and (II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or 







In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress sought 
to “root out all manner of fraud” in securities by launching its 
“first experiment in federal regulation of the securities 
industry”—the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.  Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 
1102, 1104 (2019) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 198 (1963)).  At the same time, 
Congress left undisturbed private remedies under state 
common law and so-called “blue-sky” laws.  See Edgar v. 
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(a), 
78bb(a).  This dual system of remedies has persisted since 
then, allowing aggrieved investors generally to seek redress 
under both state and federal law.4 
                                              
3 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291, and the 
District Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Because this appeal does not turn on any 
jurisdictional fact-finding conducted by the District Court, we 
exercise plenary review.  See In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds 
Fee Litig., 553 F.3d at 254; White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010). 
4 Some of the Securities Act’s and Exchange Act’s 
provisions include express private rights of action, see, e.g., 
15 U.S.C. § 77k (Section 11 of the Securities Act), while 
federal courts under the “ancien regime” recognized implied 
rights of action under others—most notably, section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 
(2017) (citation omitted) (plurality opinion); see Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).  




Sixty years later, Congress revisited this dual system 
of remedies in the PSLRA, primarily to curb “perceived 
abuses of the class-action vehicle in litigation involving 
nationally traded securities.”  Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. 
Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018) (quoting Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 
(2006)).  Rather than proscribing private suits under the 
securities laws outright, the PSLRA includes a series of 
mechanisms to dismiss unsubstantiated suits without 
discovery, see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b), impose sanctions for 
frivolous actions, see id. § 78u-4(c), create a safe-harbor for 
certain forward-looking statements, see id. § 78u-5, and 
ensure that responsible stakeholders maintain control over 
class-action litigation, see id. § 78u-4(a)(3).  These provisions, 
however, govern only securities claims brought under federal 
law in federal court.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(1), 78u-4(a)(1). 
So, dissatisfied with the PSLRA, some entrepreneurial 
plaintiffs began filing putative class actions in state court to 
evade the Act’s strictures.  Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at 82.  As 
class actions alleging only state-law claims, these suits 
generally could not be removed to federal court under the 
then-prevailing diversity-jurisdiction rules.  See Zahn v. Int’l 
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973), superseded in part by 
                                                                                                     
since shifted, see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 
(2001); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173–78 (1994), it has accepted 
these implied causes of action under stare decisis and as 
ratified by Congress in the PSLRA, see Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 274–75 (2014); 





28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  To curtail this unprecedented shift of 
class-action securities litigation to state courts, Congress 
enacted SLUSA.  Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at 82.  But, yet 
again, Congress chose a measured approach.  SLUSA “does 
not deny any individual plaintiff, or indeed any group of 
fewer than 50 plaintiffs, the right to enforce any state-law 
cause of action that may exist.”  Id. at 87.  Instead, the 
SLUSA simply precludes (with some exceptions) investors 
from litigating their state-law claims alleging securities fraud 
through a “covered class action.”  See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1). 
SLUSA’s definition of a “covered class action” 
comprises two parts.  The first part, which all agree does not 
apply here, encompasses any lawsuit that seeks to recover 
damages for more than 50 persons or on a representational 
basis.  15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i).  The second part, which 
we shall dub the “mass-action provision,” covers lawsuits 
that: (1) are “filed in or pending in the same court”; (2) 
involve common legal or factual questions; (3) seek damages 
for more than 50 persons; and (4) “are joined, consolidated, 
or otherwise proceed as a single action for any purpose.”  
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B); accord Instituto De Prevision 
Militar v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 
2008). 
Because the total number of investors in Plaintiffs’ 
lawsuits does not exceed fifty, SLUSA’s mass-action 
provision does not apply unless their individual opt-out 
lawsuits and the settled class actions together satisfy the 
statutory definition.  On that front, Plaintiffs do not dispute 
that the class actions and their individual lawsuits were both 
filed in the District of New Jersey and involve substantially 
the same facts.  Thus, this appeal turns on the fourth prong of 




subsequent opt-out suits were “joined, consolidated, or 
otherwise proceed[ed] as a single action for any purpose.”  
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II).   
The opt-out plaintiffs insist that their individual actions 
do not satisfy this “single-action” requirement because they 
have never proceeded as a single action with the class actions.  
They argue both that their suits postdated the resolution of the 
class actions and that their suits were never coordinated with 
the class actions.  By contrast, Merck interprets the single-
action requirement to require a mere “functional relationship” 
between two suits, an amorphous standard so “broad[] and 
flexibl[e]” that it would seemingly embrace every suit that 
happens to share similar substantive allegations.  Appellees’ 
Br. 4. 
We conclude Merck’s strained reading contravenes 
both the plain text and underlying constitutional principles.  
Instead, as we explain below, (A) some actual coordination is 
required to constitute a single action, and (B) there was no 
such coordination between Plaintiffs’ opt-out suits and the 
prior class actions.  
A. The Single-Action Requirement Requires 
Some Actual Coordination 
a. The Phrase “Join[der], Consolidat[ion], 
or Otherwise Proceed[ing] as a Single 
Action” Plainly Demands Coordination 
We begin, as we must, with the mass-action 
provision’s text.  See Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 
(2016).  To qualify as a mass action, the lawsuits must be 




for any purpose.”  15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II).  We first 
consider the meaning of “joined” and “consolidated” before 
turning to the phrase “otherwise proceed as a single action.” 
In law, the verbs “join” and “consolidate” share very 
similar meanings.  See Consolidation of actions, Black’s Law 
Dictionary 309 (1990) (cross-referencing joinder).  “Join” 
means “to combine or unite in time, effort, action,” Join, 
Black’s Law Dictionary 836 (1990), while “consolidate” 
means “to unite or unify into one mass or body,” Consolidate, 
Black’s Law Dictionary 308 (1990).  When used to refer to 
the joinder or consolidation of lawsuits, these words typically 
connote the “uniting [of] several actions,” sometimes for all 
purposes, Consolidation of actions, Black’s Law Dictionary 
309 (1990), while other times just for pretrial purposes, see 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a); 9A Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. 
Prac. & Proc. § 2382 n.20 (3d ed. 2019).  In federal court, the 
joinder or consolidation of separate suits is governed by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, which provides that a 
court may “join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue” 
in separate lawsuits or “consolidate the actions.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 42(a) (emphasis added).  In describing this rule, the 
Supreme Court has used “joinder” and “consolidation” 
interchangeably and observed that joining or consolidating 
cases results in the “merger” of “one or many or all of the 
phases of the several actions.”  Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 
1125, 1130 (2018) (citation omitted). 
We find these authorities instructive in ascertaining 
what Congress meant by the phrase “otherwise proceed as a 
single action for any purpose.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II).  Merck scrounges up a couple of 
dictionary definitions defining “proceed” as “to come forth 




Appellees’ Br. 32 (quoting Proceed, Merriam-Webster’s 
Dictionary (2018)).  But we are not persuaded that Congress 
meant the word “proceed” in either sense:  The “come forth 
from a single source” meaning does not fit at all because the 
provision neither uses the preposition “from” nor does it 
identify any source from which the lawsuits must arise.5  The 
“continue after pause or interruption” definition comes closer 
to the meaning here, but it too does not naturally relate to a 
“single action,” much less joinder or consolidation.  Instead, 
we conclude Congress intended the legal definition of 
“proceed,” which—consistent with the meaning of joinder 
and consolidation in Black’s Law Dictionary and Rule 
42(a)—means “to carry on a legal action or process,” 
Proceed, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1807 
(1990) [hereinafter Webster’s Third Dictionary]; see also 
Proceed, The American Heritage Dictionary 1444 (3d ed. 
1992) (“[t]o institute and conduct legal action”). 
With this definition of “proceed” in mind, we consider 
what Congress meant by the broader phrase “otherwise 
proceed as a single action for any purpose.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II).  The adjective “single,” when used in 
this statute to modify “action,” means “consisting of one as 
opposed to or in contrast with many,” while “action” refers to 
                                              
5 Webster’s Third Dictionary offers, as an example of 
the “come forth from a source” definition, a line from Charles 
Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities capturing how Doctor 
Manette’s “lips began to form some words, though no sound 
proceeded from them.”  Proceed, Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 1807 (1990) (emphasis added).  
Merck’s contention that Congress intended this meaning of 




a suit.  Webster’s Third Dictionary 21, 2123; see also Single, 
American Heritage Dictionary 1684 (3d ed. 1992) (“[n]ot 
divided; unbroken”).  By qualifying “single action” with the 
prepositional phrase “for any purpose,” Congress clarified 
that the lawsuits need not proceed together for all—or even 
most—purposes; a group of lawsuits may satisfy the statutory 
requirement even if a court contemplates separate trials, 
judgments, or hearings.  See Instituto De Prevision Militar, 
546 F.3d at 1347.  In this respect, SLUSA extends beyond the 
Class Action Fairness Act’s mass-action removal provision, 
which exempts all pretrial coordination.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV).  But, at a minimum, suits do not 
“proceed as a single action” unless they are somehow 
combined for the joint management of a common stage of the 
proceedings (such as discovery) or the resolution of a 
common question of law or fact. 
A corollary of our reading is that, as a general matter, 
cases cannot “proceed as a single action” unless they coincide 
for some period.  If two cases never overlap, a court cannot 
combine them for management of a common stage of the 
proceedings or for resolution of a common question.  Thus, 
while we cannot rule out some extraordinary exception, we 
are hard-pressed to imagine any scenario in which two cases 
that never overlap could function as a single lawsuit on any 
dimension, as the mass-action provision requires.  To be 
clear, we do not read the single action requirement to mean 
that cases must be coextensive with one another but rather 
that they be at least partially coordinated, which would seem 
invariably to require that they coincide for some period.  See, 
e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 




where two cases were combined for discovery for some time, 
but one case was later settled and dismissed). 
This common-sense interpretation draws further 
support from the time-honored canon ejusdem generis, which 
teaches that “where general words follow an enumeration of 
two or more things,” those successive words refer “only to 
persons or things of the same general kind or class 
specifically mentioned.”  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law 199 (2012); see, e.g., Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. 
& Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 
371, 384 (2003).  For the canon to adhere, the preceding 
words in the list must share a “common attribute.”  Ali v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 225 (2008). 
The mass-action provision presents a textbook case for 
applying ejusdem generis.  The preceding verbs “joined” and 
“consolidated” are nearly synonymous when used to refer to 
the union of lawsuits, and “otherwise” signals a commonality 
between those preceding words and the phrase “proceed as a 
single action.”  See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 
143–44 (2008), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); id. at 151 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment) (agreeing with the majority that “by 
using the word ‘otherwise’ the writer draws a substantive 
connection between two sets” based on “whatever follows 
‘otherwise’”); Bd. of Ed. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 143 (1979) 
(accepting that a statute’s use of “otherwise” connotes a link 
with a preceding clause).  The meaning of join and consolidate 
therefore illustrates what Congress meant by the phrase 
“otherwise proceed as a single action.” 
Confronted with these textual clues, Merck seizes on 




use of the word “any” may favor a broader reading, see, e.g., 
Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2019), its meaning 
“necessarily depends on the statutory context,” Nat’l Ass’n of 
Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 629 (2018).  Or, as 
the Supreme Court quipped in rejecting another strange 
interpretation of SLUSA premised on the word “any,” “we do 
not read statutes in little bites.”  Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 
547 U.S. 633, 643 (2006).  Here, “any” modifies “purpose”; it 
provides no cause for reading the preceding phrase “proceed 
as a single action” “completely out of the statute.”  Nat’l 
Ass’n of Mfrs., 138 S. Ct. at 629.  Nor does “any” preclude 
the application of ejusdem generis.  See, e.g., Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114 (2001) (applying the 
canon to the phrase “any other class of workers engaged in . . 
. commerce”).  Thus, the “word ‘any’ . . . does not bear the 
heavy weight” that Merck places on it.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 
138 S. Ct. at 629. 
Merck equally misses the mark in contending that the 
single-action requirement must receive a counter-textual 
construction to avoid rendering the mass-action provision’s 
first prong—the separate requirement that the suits be “filed 
in or pending in” the same court, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii) (emphasis added)—superfluous.  By 
reaching suits “filed in or pending in” a court, SLUSA’s 
mass-action provision addresses both actions that originate in 
a particular court and those that are transferred or removed 
there.  See In re Enron Corp. Secs., 535 F.3d 325, 334, 341 
(5th Cir. 2008) (finding the single-action requirement 
satisfied where defendants removed the suits as “related to” a 
bankruptcy proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334).  If anything, 
Merck disregards the canon against superfluity by conflating 




the requirement that the suits share “common questions of 
law or fact.”  15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii). 
At bottom, notwithstanding Merck’s linguistic 
gymnastics, the single-action requirement cannot be contorted 
enough to cover “functional coordination,” as opposed to 
actual coordination and, as a general matter, there is no 
occasion for actual coordination if suits never overlap in time. 
b. SLUSA’s Broad-Construction Principle 
Is Unavailing 
With so little in the text to support its interpretation, 
Merck leans heavily on the premise that SLUSA should 
receive “a broad interpretation . . . to ensure the uniform 
application of federal fraud standards.”  Appellees’ Br. 22 
(quoting Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 
294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005)).  This argument is doubly flawed. 
First, despite entreaties, Congress has repeatedly 
declined the invitation—in the Securities Act, the Exchange 
Act, the PSLRA, and SLUSA itself—to broadly preempt 
state-law securities claims.  In enacting SLUSA, Congress 
“simply denie[d] plaintiffs the right to use the class-action 
device to vindicate certain claims”; it chose not to “actually 
pre-empt any state cause of action.”  Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. 
at 87.  Merck’s interpretation would upend Congress’s 
measured approach.  Any serious allegations of securities 
fraud will likely prompt the filing of at least one putative 
class-action lawsuit.  Under Merck’s reading, the mere 
existence of a class action would preclude individual 
plaintiffs from bringing state-law claims, even if individual 
plaintiffs do not participate at all in the class proceedings and, 




action.6  As a result, Merck’s proposed construction would 
foster the complete preemption of state-law securities 
claims—precisely what Congress chose not to do in adopting 
SLUSA.  See Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at 87. 
Second, and more importantly, as the Supreme Court 
has recently admonished lower courts, the “broad-
construction” canon does not render SLUSA somehow 
magically impervious to traditional tools of statutory 
construction.  See Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1072.  Because “[n]o 
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs,” courts have “no 
license to disregard clear language based on an intuition that 
Congress must have intended something broader.”  Id. at 
1073, 1078 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
And consistent with that admonition, we will not read the 
mass-action provision “in a most improbable way” just “to 
make the world of securities litigation more consistent or 
pure.”  Id. at 1073.  In short, Merck’s insistence that SLUSA 
                                              
6 Of course, for SLUSA’s mass-action provision to 
adhere, the actions would also have to be “filed in or pending 
in” the same court, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii), and 
defendants could not use SLUSA’s removal provision to 
manufacture this prerequisite for preclusion, see Cyan, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1076–78; Kircher, 547 U.S. at 644 n.12; see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9) (excluding securities suits from the Class 
Action Fairness Act’s grant of diversity jurisdiction).  But, as 
these cases reflect, opt-out plaintiffs often pair state-law 
claims with Exchange Act claims, which cannot be brought in 
state court.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a).  Through simple venue 
transfer and multidistrict centralization, then, opt-out lawsuits 





should be broadly interpreted for policy reasons is unavailing 
in the face of the statutory text. 
c. Merck’s Expansive Reading Raises 
Constitutional Concerns 
Our reading of the statute also ensures that it comports 
with the Constitution, for it would raise serious due process 
concerns if Congress conditioned the extinguishment of opt-
out investors’ state-law claims on whether an unaffiliated 
party had elected to bring a putative class action.  To comport 
with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, every absent 
class member must “be provided with an opportunity to 
remove himself from” a class action seeking predominantly 
damages.  Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 
(1985); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 
338, 363 (2011).  That is, at least where damages are at stake, 
the class-action device passes constitutional scrutiny only 
because putative class members can easily extricate 
themselves from the proceedings.  Thus, to the extent that a 
policy burdens that opt-out right or, worse yet, saps it of 
meaning, it would raise serious constitutional concerns.  
Thankfully, at least in this case, the mass-action provision 
evinces no intent to press these constitutional boundaries.7 
                                              
7 This case does not present a circumstance in which a 
district court, over an opt-out plaintiff’s objection, 
consolidated her action with a class action, thereby 
extinguishing her state-law claims.  See Instituto De Prevision 
Militar, 546 F.3d at 1347 (hypothesizing that an opt-out 
plaintiff might avoid the mass-action provision by “argu[ing] 
to the district court that consolidation was inappropriate 




In sum, we conclude that two suits are not “joined, 
consolidated, or otherwise proceed[ing] as a single action for 
any purpose,” 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II), unless the 
actions are somehow combined, in whole or in part, for case 
management or for resolution of at least one common issue. 
B. Plaintiffs’ Opt-Out Suits Never Proceeded as 
a Single Action with the Prior Class Actions 
Applying our view of the single-action provision 
presents no difficulties.  In finding the suits precluded, the 
District Court relied on the mere fact that the opt-out 
investors happened to meet a class definition, filed complaints 
resembling their class counterparts, complied with certain 
local rules requiring them to identify the class actions as 
related, and predicted that defendants would not have to 
duplicate discovery.  See N. Sound Capital, 314 F. Supp. 3d 
at 610–12.  But Plaintiffs’ suits and the prior class actions 
never existed at the same time.  So it comes as no surprise 
that the purported “indicia of coordination,” id. at 612, even 
taken together, do not suggest actual coordination. 
It is axiomatic that an unnamed class member is not “a 
party to the class-action litigation before the class is 
certified.”  Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313 (2011) 
(emphasis and citation omitted).  For class actions seeking 
predominantly damages, Rule 23 adds that putative class 
members do not become party plaintiffs until the time to opt 
                                                                                                     
SLUSA preclusion”); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(F) (providing 
that SLUSA’s definition of a covered action does not “affect 
the discretion of a State court” to join or consolidate actions, 
without mentioning federal courts).  We therefore leave that 




out has elapsed.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v)–(vi), 
(3)(B); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 
(1974); Reppert v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 53, 
56–57 (1st Cir. 2004).  If an absent class member exercises 
this right, “she can litigate herself another time—or choose to 
not litigate at all.”  William B. Rubenstein, 3 Newberg on 
Class Actions § 9:38 (5th ed. 2019).  By guaranteeing 
putative class members an unqualified right to exclude 
themselves, Rule 23 honors “our ‘deep-rooted historic 
tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.’”  
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (quoting 
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989)).  Thus, if a 
plaintiff has timely opted out of a class action, the mere fact 
that he satisfies a class definition does not suggest 
coordination.  
To be sure, despite opting out, an erstwhile class 
member turned individual plaintiff may incidentally benefit 
from the existence of a class action:  Pleadings have been 
filed, arguments aired, and perhaps even precedent 
established.8  Here, for instance, rather than starting from 
                                              
8 To this list of potential benefits, Merck adds for the 
first time on appeal American Pipe tolling, a rule that tolls the 
statute of limitations for individual claims while timely class 
claims remain pending.  Blake v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 
927 F.3d 701, 708–09 (3d Cir. 2019).  But the opt-out 
investors here likely need not rely on American Pipe, because 
their state-law fraud claims enjoy a six-year statute of 
limitations, which follows the discovery rule.  Cetel v. 
Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 513 (3d Cir. 2006).  At 
any rate, the possibility of American Pipe tolling 




scratch, the opt-out investors undoubtedly considered the 
class action complaints in drafting their own.  But the statute 
does not speak of obtaining a benefit, but of “join[der], 
consolidat[ion], or otherwise proceed[ing] as a single action 
for any purpose.”  15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II).  The 
commonalities in Plaintiffs’ pleadings certainly satisfied 
SLUSA’s separate requirement that the suits “involve[e] 
common questions of law or fact,” id. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii), and 
could have induced a court or the parties themselves to 
coordinate the actions had their suits overlapped in time.  But 
it did not, so that determinative step was never taken. 
Merck’s intimation that any benefit satisfies the single-
action requirement—besides lacking a foothold in the 
statute—proves too much.  Merck places great weight on 
parallels between Plaintiffs’ pleading and the class-action 
complaints, but Plaintiffs would have received a benefit even 
if they had completely rewritten their pleadings or just read 
the pleadings once before conducting their own investigation.  
Only a hermetically sealed opt-out investor could possibly 
escape the all-encompassing sweep of Merck’s proposed 
atextual rule.9 
                                                                                                     
may receive certain benefits (such as the tolling of a 
limitations period) related to that proceeding,” Smith, 564 
U.S. at 313 n.10—not that an individual action and class 
action are “joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed[ing] as 
a single action.” 
 
9 Unlike the District Court, we do not believe that the 
failure to explicitly carve out opt-out suits suggests anything, 
much less “speaks volumes.”  N. Sound Capital, 314 F. Supp. 




Finally, neither Plaintiffs’ identification of the class 
actions as related nor their statements before the District 
Court give us pause.  Under the District of New Jersey’s 
Local Rules, Plaintiffs had to identify the class actions as 
related because their suits involved the same subject matter as 
the class actions.  See D.N.J. L. Civ. R. 5.1(e), 11.2; 40.1(c).  
While such a filing could eventually result in coordination 
with another pending action, merely identifying the other 
actions as related has no such effect.  And the Plaintiffs’ 
statements before the District Court, made to dissuade it from 
certifying its first dismissal order for interlocutory review, 
simply played down the burden that their suits would pose; 
they did not insinuate that the opt-out plaintiffs had 
collaborated with the class-action plaintiffs.  
Our conclusion does not conflict with any circuit 
decision to have considered the single-action requirement.  
See Instituto De Prevision Militar, 546 F.3d at 1347 
(individual plaintiff agreed to consolidate discovery with 
class action); In re Enron Corp. Secs., 535 F.3d at 342 (more 
than 50 plaintiffs, represented by the same counsel, filed joint 
motions and coordinated discovery); see also Amorosa v. 
AOL Time Warner Inc., 409 F. App’x 412, 417 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(affirming, in an unpublished summary order, the district 
court’s conclusion that a plaintiff’s state-law claims satisfied 
the mass-action provision, where he voluntarily agreed to stay 
                                                                                                     
an exemption in construing a general mandate if one 
interpretation of the mandate would render the exemption 
superfluous.  See, e.g., Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 
F.3d 226, 231 (4th Cir. 2007).  But we fail to see how the lack 





his actions pending the resolution of several motions to 
dismiss).  Beyond these authorities, the parties devote much 
of their briefing on appeal to various district court decisions.  
We do not feel compelled to dwell on them, because, as the 
District Court recognized, none deemed the single-action 
requirement satisfied on such meager facts.  But we hasten to 
note our concern with one perceptible trend:  From a broad 
but plausible interpretation of the single-action requirement, 
some reasoning in these decisions has become increasingly 
unmoored from the statutory text.10  Today, we steer this 
jurisprudence towards safer waters. 
III. Conclusion 
For busy courts presiding over complex securities 
litigation, opt-out lawsuits can sometimes seem nettlesome.  
But the right to exclude oneself from a class action, even if 
not actually exercised by most class members, should not be 
                                              
 10 See, e.g., Discovery Glob. Citizens Master Fund, 
Ltd. v. Valeant Pharm. Int’l, Inc., No. 16-cv-7321, 2018 WL 
406046, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2018) (noting it was 
“unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument that [the individual 
actions] are separate and independent from . . . the Class 
Action” in part because they “explicitly identified [the Class 
Action] on their Civil Cover Sheet” and “rely on the Court’s 
decision in the Class Action in connection with [its] 
motions”); Kuwait Inv. Office v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 128 F. 
Supp. 3d 792, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding the fact that 
plaintiffs “assert the same factual and federal legal claims 
raised in the Class Action” salient to whether the single action 





discounted or derided as “gamesmanship.”  By its terms, 
SLUSA does not disturb the right to opt out, and we refuse to 
abandon traditional tools of statutory interpretation and 
common sense to give Merck what Congress has not.  We 
will therefore reverse the District Court’s dismissal order and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.11 
                                              
11 In its renewed motion to dismiss, Merck also urged 
the District Court to decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, N. Sound 
Capital, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 599; see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), and 
we recognize it may do so again.  We note that these suits 
have been pending for more than five years and produced two 
appeals to this Court.  In the ordinary course, “where the 
claim[s] over which the district court has original jurisdiction 
[are] dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to 
decide the pendent state claims.”  Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 
109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).  But it need not do 
so where “considerations of judicial economy, convenience, 
and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification 
for doing so.”  Id. (citation omitted).  We leave this 
determination to the discretion of the District Court.  See 
Charles Alan Wright et al., 13D Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3567.3 
(3d ed. 2019) (observing that the presumption that a district 
court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it 
has dismissed all original-jurisdiction claims “is just that—a 
presumption and not a rule”). 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
Plaintiffs are sixteen institutional investors who 
purchased Merck & Co., Inc. (“Merck”) and Merck/Schering 
Plough Pharmaceuticals (“Schering”) stock.  They appeal the 
District Court’s order dismissing their state-law fraud claims 
as barred under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act’s (“SLUSA”) preclusion provision, 15 U.S.C. § 
78bb(f)(1).  Whether Plaintiffs’ complaints are precluded 
depends on whether their cases are part of a “covered class 
action” under SLUSA.  As explained below, because Plaintiffs, 
as class members, participated in and benefited from numerous 
pretrial proceedings in the Vytorin Class Action cases, their 
opt-out actions functionally proceeded as a single action with 
the class actions.  I would therefore hold that the District Court 
correctly dismissed their complaints under SLUSA’s 
preclusion provision.1    
                                              
1 SLUSA dismissals are jurisdictional because SLUSA 
prohibits “covered class actions” from being “maintained” in 
“[f]ederal court.”  Hampton v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 869 F.3d 
844, 847 (9th Cir. 2017).  As a result, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) applies.  See In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds 
Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2009).  Under Rule 
12(b)(1), a defendant may launch a factual challenge to subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 
F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016).  In a factual attack, “the court is 
free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence 
of its power to hear the case, and no presumptive truthfulness 
attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations.”  Id. (quotation marks 
and alteration omitted).  Thus, we may consider evidence 
outside the pleadings.  Id.  The plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving that jurisdiction exists.  Id.   
2 
 
I reach this conclusion based on SLUSA’s purpose and 
text.  Congress enacted SLUSA to “prevent certain State 
private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from 
being used to frustrate the objectives of the [Private Securities 
Litigation] Reform Act [of 1995] (‘PSLRA’).”  Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006) 
(citations omitted).  The PSLRA sought to “curb abuses in 
private class securities litigation” by “implement[ing] a host of 
procedural and substantive reforms, including more stringent 
pleading requirements to curtail the filing of meritless 
lawsuits.”  Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 
294, 298 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Securities plaintiffs attempted to avoid PSLRA’s requirements 
“by filing private securities class actions in state rather than 
federal court.”  Id.  Congress passed SLUSA “to close this 
perceived loophole by authorizing the removal and federal 
preemption [or preclusion] of certain state court securities class 
actions.”  Id.; LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 128 (3d 
Cir. 2008).   
 
SLUSA contains a provision that precludes “covered 
class action[s]” from proceeding in state or federal court.  § 
78bb(f)(1).  This provision provides, in relevant part:   
 
No covered class action based upon the statutory 
or common law of any State or subdivision 
                                              
We construe jurisdictional statutes such as SLUSA’s 
preclusion provision “mindful that it is our obligation to 
effectuate the intentions of Congress in interpreting those 
statutes.”  New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity 
Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1510 (3d Cir. 1996).  
3 
 
thereof may be maintained in any State or 
Federal court by any private party alleging— 
 
(A) a misrepresentation or omission of a 
material fact in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a covered 
security . . . . 
 
Id.  SLUSA thus precludes actions that satisfy the following 
four elements: (1) “covered class action”; (2) based on state 
statutory or common law; (3) concerning a covered security; 
and (4) alleging that defendants made a misrepresentation or 
omission of a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase 
or sale of that security.”2  O’Donnell v. AXA Equitable Life 
Ins. Co., 887 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2018).  Only the first 
element is in dispute: whether Plaintiffs’ state-law fraud claims 
are part of a “covered class action.”   
 
SLUSA defines “covered class action” as: 
 
(ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in 
the same court and involving common questions 
of law or fact, in which-- 
 
                                              
2 Other courts have similarly parsed the preclusion 
provision.  See Fleming v. Charles Schwab Corp., 878 F.3d 
1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2017); In re Enron Corp. Sec., 535 F.3d 
325, 338-39 (5th Cir. 2008); Herndon v. Equitable Variable 
Life Ins. Co., 325 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2003); see also 




(I) damages are sought on behalf of more 
than 50 persons; and 
  
(II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, 
or otherwise proceed as a single action for 
any purpose.3 
 
§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii).  The sole question here is whether 
Plaintiffs’ individual actions and the Vytorin Class Actions 
“otherwise proceed[ed] as a single action for any purpose.”4   
Id. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II).  To answer this question, we must 
decipher the meaning of this phrase.5    
                                              
3 A “covered class action” also includes certain “single” 
lawsuits that are not at issue.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i).  
4 Plaintiffs agree that (1) they filed their opt-out suits in 
the same court where the Vytorin Class Actions were litigated 
and (2) their suits share a common question of law or fact with 
the Vytorin Class Actions.   
5 Only two Courts of Appeals have addressed this 
subject and they support the conclusion here: In re Enron Corp. 
Sec., 535 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2008), and Amorosa v. AOL Time 
Warner Inc., 409 F. App’x 412 (2d Cir. 2011).  In Enron, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal based 
on SLUSA’s preclusion provision because plaintiffs filed 
“nearly identical complaints” with the MDL; jointly scheduled 
discovery with the MDL; filed joint motions; provided “nearly 
identical discovery responses”; and used the “same experts and 
expert reports” in their individual actions.  Enron, 535 F.3d at 
342.   
In Amorosa, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit also affirmed dismissal based on SLUSA’s preclusion 





To determine the phrase’s meaning, we begin with its 
language.  In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig, 553 F.3d 
248, 254 (3d Cir. 2009).  “If the language of the statute 
expresses Congress’s intent with sufficient precision, the 
inquiry ends there and the statute is enforced according to its 
terms.”  Id. (citation omitted).  If, however, the statute “does 
not express Congress’s intent unequivocally,” we refer to its 
legislative history “and the atmosphere in which the statute was 
enacted . . . to determine the congressional purpose.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).     
 
For Plaintiffs’ lawsuits to be a “covered class action,” 
they must “otherwise proceed as a single action for any 
purpose.”  15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II).  The clause has 
two words that indicate the phrase “covered class action” has a 
broad definition: “otherwise” and “any.”  The word 
“otherwise” is used along with “joined” and “consolidated,” so 
the statute’s separate inclusion of these words reveals that the 
use of the word “otherwise” seeks to capture actions other than 
those that have been actually associated via formal invocation 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Otherwise, 
Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/133247? 
redirectedFrom=otherwise#eid (last visited Aug. 25, 2019) 
                                              
district court in its opinion.”  409 F. App’x at 417.  The district 
court in Amorosa analyzed several coordinated procedural 
events in determining that the plaintiff’s action was a “covered 
class action” under SLUSA.  See Amorosa v. Ernst & Young 




(defining “otherwise” as an adverb that means “in another 
way”); see also Amorosa v. Ernst & Young LLP, 682 F. Supp. 
2d 351, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]his Court holds that an 
action need not have been formally joined or consolidated with 
other actions in order to be a ‘covered class action’ and subject 
to SLUSA’s [preclusion] provision.”).  Thus, the word 
“otherwise” captures a broader swath of litigation activity than 
that involving formally joined or consolidated actions.   
 
“[T]he word ‘any’ [also] has an expansive meaning, that 
is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’”  United 
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)).  “Any” is 
“used to refer to a member of a particular group or class 
without distinction or limitation (hence implying every 
member of the class or group, since every one may in turn be 
taken as a representative).”  Any, Oxford English Dictionary 
Online, http://www.oed.com/view         
/Entry/8973?redirectedFrom=any#eid (last visited Aug. 25, 
2019).  The word “any” “can and does mean different things 
depending upon the setting.”  Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 
U.S. 125, 132 (2004); Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 
388 (2005) (noting that while the word “any” “demands a 
broad interpretation,” it still cannot be “considered alone”).  As 
a result, we must look to surrounding words to determine what 
the word “any” captures.  See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 
145, 149 (1960).    
 
Here, “any” modifies the singular noun “purpose.”  See 
§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii).  The word “purpose,” in turn, is either a 
“determined intention or aim” or “[t]he reason for which 
something is done or made, or for which it exists.”  Purpose, 




result =1#eid (last visited Aug. 25, 2019).  
 
Together, these dictionary definitions reveal that the 
phrase “covered class action” has a broad meaning that 
includes an action that (1) is not necessarily formally joined or 
consolidated with a specific case but (2) still proceeds with that 
case “as a single action” for whatever reason.6  See § 
78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 
220 (2008) (“Congress’ use of ‘any’ to modify ‘other law 
enforcement officer’ is most naturally read to mean law 
enforcement officers of whatever kind.”); see also Cyan, Inc. 
v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (2018) 
(observing that the phrase “covered class action” has a “broad 




Focusing on the phrase “proceed as a single action for 
any purpose,” my colleagues entertain accepting Plaintiffs’ 
invitation to impose a simultaneity requirement so that the 
SLUSA-precluded actions must be pending at the same time as 
the class action.  The Majority appropriately notes that 
simultaneity is not an absolute requirement, Maj. Op. at 17, 
and, in fact, there are three reasons why such a requirement 
does not exist. 
 
First, the word “single” does not inherently involve a 
timing component.  As an adjective, “single” means “[s]ole, 
unaccompanied, individual; separate” or “[i]ndividual, as 
                                              
6 I agree with the Majority’s interpretation of the words 
“proceed” and “action.”  Maj. Op. at 16-17.  
8 
 
contrasted with larger bodies or number of persons or things.”  
Single, Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/180129?rskey=IvoNvj&resu
lt= 2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited Aug. 25, 2019).  My 
colleagues similarly note that the adjective “single” means 
“consisting of one as opposed to or in contrast with many.”  
Maj. Op. at 16.  My colleagues also observe that, “[b]y 
qualifying ‘single action’ with the prepositional phrase ‘for any 
purpose,’ Congress clarified that the lawsuits need not proceed 
together” to constitute a single action.  Maj. Op. at 17.  This 
reading makes sense.  Although my colleagues require the 
cases to be combined for joint management for SLUSA’s 
preclusion provision to apply, they recognize that the cases 
need not always coincide for some time period.  A plain-text 
reading shows that their recognition is warranted; the phrase 
“any purpose” is broad and not limited to simultaneous events.  
In context, it captures suits that “proceed as a single action” for 
functional reasons.  In other words, lawsuits that functionally 
proceed as a single action may fall within SLUSA’s preclusive 
scope and need not pend simultaneously.7     
  
Second, principles of statutory interpretation do not 
command a simultaneity requirement.  The Majority relies on 
                                              
7 Likewise, the word “proceed” in the preclusion 
provision does not have a timing component.  The Majority 
states that “proceed” means “to carry on a legal action or 
process.”  Maj. Op. at 16.  Even under the Majority’s 
interpretation of the word “proceed,” Plaintiffs’ individual 
actions proceeded with the Vytorin Class Actions because the 
claims in both cases started together, as Plaintiffs pursued their 
claims as class members until they opted out. 
9 
 
the ejusdem generis canon8 and concludes that, because the 
verbs “joined” and “consolidated” share almost identical 
meanings and involve contemporaneous lawsuits, so too must 
the phrase “proceed as a single action.”9  Maj. Op. at 18.  
Ejusdem generis is a “statutory canon” providing that “where 
                                              
8 Plaintiffs never invoked ejusdem generis before the 
District Court, and so the Majority assumes that Plaintiffs did 
not forfeit their ejusdem generis argument on appeal.    See 
Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 
F.3d 136, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that the failure to 
timely assert an argument constitutes a forfeiture and that we 
“will not reach a forfeited issue in civil cases absent truly 
exceptional circumstances” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
9 In addition, the grammatical structure of the “covered 
class action” clause does not lend itself easily to ejusdem 
generis.  SLUSA’s preclusion provision bars lawsuits that “are 
joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action 
for any purpose.”  15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B).  The words 
“joined” and “consolidated” are similar because the linking 
verb “are” governs their meaning.  By contrast, the phrase 
“otherwise proceed as a single action for any purpose” has its 
own independent verb, “proceed”; the verb “are” does not 
affect the phrase “otherwise proceed as a single action for any 
purpose.”  Congress could have drafted the final part as 
“otherwise proceeding as a single action for any purpose” to 
maintain the parallel structure but chose not to do so.  Thus, 
ejusdem generis does not necessarily apply.  See United States 
v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 293 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (observing, in the context of ejusdem generis, that 
“general phrases cannot be so narrowly construed that they 
become meaningless”).  
10 
 
general words follow specific words in a statutory 
enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only 
objects similar to those objects enumerated by the preceding 
specific words.”  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 
105, 114-15 (2001) (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted).  Ejusdem generis “is not a rule of law but merely a 
useful tool of construction resorted to in ascertaining 
legislative intent.”  Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. 
Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, Inc., 164 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 
1998).  Because the plain meaning of the words reflects 
Congress’ intent, it is unnecessary to apply this canon.  Id. 
(holding that ejusdem generis “should not be employed when 
the intention of the legislature is otherwise evident” (citation 
omitted)). 
 
Moreover, even when applying ejusdem generis, we 
have noted that “Congress does not intend every seemingly 
open-ended phrase to be read narrowly.”  United States v. EME 
Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 292 (3d Cir. 
2013).  “From time to time, a broadly worded statutory term is 
intended to be just that—broad.”  Id.  The words “otherwise” 
and “any” in this phrase fall squarely in that category.  The 
phrase “proceed as a single action for any purpose” is broad 
and includes lawsuits that proceed as a single action for 
functional reasons, even if they are not pending at the same 
time.  § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii).  This reading accords with Congress’ 
intent of maintaining a “broad interpretation of SLUSA,” 
Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 299 (citing S. Rep. No. 105-182, at *8 
(1998)), to inhibit circumvention of the PSLRA.  Because 
SLUSA’s language and its purpose confirm the preclusion 
provision’s broad scope, the phrase “otherwise proceed” 
11 
 
should not be limited by its more specific predecessors 
“joined” and “consolidated.”10   
                                              
10 The Majority refers to legislative inaction to show 
that Congress has “declined . . . to broadly preempt state-law 
securities claims,” Maj. Op. at 20, but SLUSA’s legislative 
history and the “atmosphere” in which it was enacted support 
a broad reading of its preclusive scope, see Lord Abbett, 553 
F.3d at 254.   
Congress passed SLUSA because plaintiffs were filing 
state-law causes of action to avoid the PSLRA’s “more 
stringent requirements,” H.R. Rep. No. 105-640, at *10 (1998), 
and hence interfered with the establishment of a uniform 
standard of liability for nationally traded securities, see S. Rep. 
No. 105-182, at *3.  To further this uniformity goal, Congress 
intended that SLUSA be “interpreted broadly to reach mass 
actions and all other procedural devices that might be used to 
circumvent the class action definition.” Id. at *8.  To this end, 
Congress, among other things, (1) provided a “definition of 
class action that [was] intended to prevent evasion of the 
[PSLRA] bill through the use of so-called ‘mass action’” and 
(2) chose the word “covered class action” in SLUSA to reflect 
that it was aimed at activity that captured more than a Rule 23 
“class action.”  Id. at *7.    
In addition, even senators who disagreed with SLUSA 
recognized that its definition of “covered class action” was 
broad, see id. at *19-20, and that it was “broad enough to pick 
up individual investors against their will” because “[e]ven if 
the lawsuits are brought by separate lawyers, without 
coordination . . . they may qualify as a class action and thus be 
preempted.”  Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-640, at *45-46 
(“[I]ndividuals who bring suits in state court in their own name 
may find, if others have brought similar suits, that their claims 
12 
 
The doctrine of absurdity also counsels against 
imposing a simultaneity requirement.  It is a “basic tenet of 
statutory construction . . . that courts should interpret a law to 
avoid absurd or bizarre results.”  In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 
456 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Lamie v. U.S. 
Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).  Grafting a simultaneity 
requirement onto SLUSA’s “covered class action” provision 
would yield an absurd result because it “defies rationality.”  
United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Under Plaintiffs’ interpretation, an opt-out action filed thirty 
minutes after a class action settles would not be SLUSA-
precluded, but the identical opt-out action filed thirty minutes 
before a class action settles would be SLUSA-precluded 
simply because such an opt-out action would be pending in a 
court contemporaneously with the class action.  
 
                                              
are preempted . . . . For instance, if an investment adviser 
churns the accounts of or recommends unsuitable securities to 
clients in a single state and more than 50 of them seek to 
recover in the same court, each filing their own individual 
action, they may be forced to constitute a class action and have 
to pursue their claims—if possible—in federal court.”).  Thus, 
Congress did not require actual coordination among plaintiffs 
for individual actions to be “covered class actions.”  See id.  
While Congress envisioned that functional coordination is 
sufficient, actual coordination occurred here, as demonstrated 
by Plaintiffs’ reliance on all of the pretrial activity in the 
Vytorin Class Actions.  See infra Section III.  The strategic 
decision to wait to file their individual lawsuits until after the 
Vytorin Class Actions settled, even though they opted out 
months earlier, was merely an attempt to avoid SLUSA’s bar.  
13 
 
Third, the statute’s “covered class action” definition 
includes a verb in the past tense, demonstrating that SLUSA 
does not demand simultaneity between the individual and class 
action.  A “covered class action” includes “any group of 
lawsuits” that is         (1) “filed in or pending in the same court” 
and (2) “otherwise proceed as a single action for any purpose.”  
§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii).  The first part of the definition is phrased 
disjunctively, and covers cases that were filed, or that are 
pending, at the time of the individual actions.  A “filed” action 
can be active or closed, and so, when used alone, the word 
“filed” is not limited to only ongoing cases.  That said, given 
the adjacent use of the word “pending” after the disjunctive 
“or” (as in “filed or pending”), the word “filed” in the statute 
refers to a closed case.  Other interpretations could render the 
word “pending” surplusage.11  Likewise, to impose a 
simultaneity requirement would read out the phrase “filed in,” 
as such a view of “covered class actions” would include only 
“any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court.”  
§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii); see TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 
(2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that 
a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it 
can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be 
superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (quotation marks 
omitted)).  Thus, the use of the past-tense “filed,” alongside 
“pending,” shows that SLUSA can preclude an ongoing opt-
out suit even though the “filed” class action settled.  As a result, 
the settled Vytorin Class Actions were “filed” actions while 
Plaintiffs’ suit against Merck and Schering were “pending.”  
                                              
11 I acknowledge my colleagues’ point that a transferred 
or removed action is not filed in, but could be pending in, a 
district court, Maj. Op. at 19, but this does not diminish the 
interpretation of “filed” versus “pending” offered herein.  
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See In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 
241, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that settled class actions 
“count towards the 50-person SLUSA threshold”).   
 
For these reasons, SLUSA’s text does not impose a 
simultaneity requirement that mandates the main class action 




As discussed above, an action may be a “covered class 
action” if it “otherwise proceed[s] as a single action for any 
purpose.”  § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II).  One such purpose is case 
management.  Thus, to determine whether a plaintiff’s 
individual action forms part of a SLUSA “covered class 
action” for case management purposes, a court must engage in 
a fact-specific inquiry that examines both “the parties’ conduct 
and the [district court’s] handling” of the cases to determine 
whether the activity in a plaintiffs individual case and the class 
action were coordinated.  Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. 
Merck & Co., Inc., Civ. No. 05-5060 (SRC), 2012 WL 
3235783, at *15 (D.N.J. Aug. 1, 2012); see also Discovery 
Global Citizens Master Fund, Ltd. v. Valeant Pharm. Int’l, Inc., 
Civ. Nos. 17-7321, 16-7324, 16-7328, 16-7494, 16-7496, 16-
7497, 2018 WL 406046, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2018) (holding 
“that the level of coordination in these related matters . . . 
triggers SLUSA preemption”).   
 
Such coordination may be revealed in the parties’ 
procedural activities.  The Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
eloquently labeled such activities as “indicia of coordination.”  
Stichting, 2012 WL 3235783, at *15.  These indicia include 




 the civil cover sheet identifies the individual 
action as “related” to the main class action, 
Amorosa, 682 F. Supp. 2d at 375-76;  
 
 the individual action’s allegations are similar to 
those of the main class action, Kuwait Inv. Office 
v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 792, 812 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); Stichting, 2012 WL 3235783, 
at *15; Amorosa, 682 F. Supp. 2d at 376; 
 
 a case management order regulates both the 
individual action and the class action, Kuwait 
Inv. Office, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 812; 
 
 the plaintiff in the individual action seeks to 
amend his complaint after motions to dismiss are 
filed or decided, see Amorosa, 682 F. Supp. 2d 
at 376;  
 
 the plaintiff in the individual action seeks to stay 
the individual action after “resolution of the 
[main] class action,” id. at 377; 
 
 the plaintiff in the individual action enjoys the 
benefit of the main class action, such as 
coordinating discovery, Kuwait, 128 F. Supp. 3d 
at 812-13; and 
 
 the plaintiff in the individual action has 
otherwise coordinated in “other litigation 
activity” with the plaintiffs in the main class 
action, such as by filing “consolidated and 
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interrelated briefing that frequently [draws] upon 
decisions and litigation events in the [c]lass 
[a]ction,” Kuwait, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 812-13; In 
re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 2d 
458, 480 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
 
The activity in the Vytorin Class Actions, along with 
Plaintiffs’ actions, reveal many “indicia of coordination,” 
Stichting, 2012 WL 3235783, at *15, and show that Plaintiffs’ 
cases “proceed[ed]” with the Vytorin Class Actions “as a 
single action for any purpose,” see § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii).  Indeed, 
even under the Majority’s test for SLUSA preclusion—that an 
individual action must “be at least partially coordinated” with 
the class action, though the individual action need not 
simultaneously pend with the class action, Maj. Op. at 17—
Plaintiffs’ lawsuits fit the bill:   
 
 Plaintiffs’ opt-out complaints were virtually 
identical to, and explicitly stated that they were 
“predicated upon,” App. 97-98, the Vytorin 
Class Action complaints, compare App. 91-96, 
with Supp. App. 1-7; 
  
 Plaintiffs’ state-law fraud claims were “virtually 
identical” to their federal securities claims that 
were the subject of the Vytorin Class Actions, 
App. 1146;  
 
 Plaintiffs certified that their complaints were the 
“subject” of the Vytorin Class Actions, see, e.g., 




 Plaintiffs marked their civil cover sheet as 
“related” to the Vytorin Class Actions, see, e.g., 
App. 449; 
 
 as class members, Plaintiffs benefitted from 
discovery and told the District Court and our 
Court that the discovery in their cases would 
largely rely on discovery already obtained in the 
Vytorin Class Actions, App. 966, 1043, Supp. 
App. 551 n.15, and any additional discovery 
would be “minimal” because their cases would 
mostly depend on class discovery, App. 985; see 
also App. 984 (stating that Plaintiffs’ state-law 
fraud claims were “virtually” the same as the 
federal securities claims and “will require 
virtually identical discovery, as [their] federal 
claims”), App. 99312; and  
 
 as class members, Plaintiffs benefited from 
various pretrial proceedings, including sealing, 
                                              
12 On remand following our ruling that Plaintiffs’ 
federal securities claims were time-barred under California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017), N. Sound Capital LLC v. Merck & Co. 
Inc., 702 F. App’x 75, 77-78 (3d Cir. 2017), Plaintiffs 
attempted to retreat from their earlier statements about the 
status of discovery.  At oral argument on the motion to dismiss 
their state-law fraud claim, Plaintiffs asserted that the 
individual actions did not have “really anything else to do with 
the class action,” and in response the District Court astutely 
observed that Plaintiffs “were going to use clearly the 
discovery,” to which Plaintiffs said, “Maybe so.” 1043a. 
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App. 892 (Dkt. Nos. 319-22); summary 
judgment, see App. 892 (Dkt. No. 316), 939 
(Dkt. No. 252); in limine and Daubert motions, 
App. 893-95 (Dkt. Nos. 340-44, 349); 
submission of a final pre-trial order, see, e.g., 
App. 944 (Dkt. No. 298); designation of 
deposition excerpts and exhibits for trial, see, 
e.g., In re Merck & Co., Inc. Vytorin/ZETIA Sec. 
Litig., No. 2:08-cv-02177, Dkt. No. 326 at 38 
(Apr. 18, 2013)13; disclosure of witness lists and 
lay opinions, id. at 10-23; submission of 
proposed voir dire, jury instructions, verdict 
sheets, id. at 51-52, and trial memoranda, App. 
899-900 (Dkt. Nos. 375, 379), and obtained the 
benefit of various stipulations, including those 
concerning trial evidence, App. 893 (Dkt. No. 
339).    
 
By filing “nearly identical complaints” to those of the 
Vytorin Class Actions and enjoying the benefits of the class-
action device to obtain discovery and the fruits of all of the 
pretrial activities before opting out, Plaintiffs “created the 
                                              
13 This pretrial order reflects the public version.  The 
original proposed pretrial order was filed in February 2013 
before Plaintiffs opted out.  App. 944 (Dkt. No. 298). 
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foundation” for SLUSA’s bar.14  In re Enron Corp. Sec., 535 
F.3d 325, 333, 342 (5th Cir. 2008).  In short, Plaintiffs made 
“use of a procedural vehicle akin to a class action” by first 
being part of the Vytorin Class Actions and then opting out to 
pursue individual actions after receiving the benefit of the 
coordinated activities in the class action.  See LaSala, 519 F.3d 
at 128.  Thus, the District Court did not err by concluding that 
Plaintiffs’ individual actions were part of a “covered class 




For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.    
                                              
14 Because Plaintiffs never raised any constitutional 
issues with applying SLUSA before the District Court or on 
appeal, and I see none, I would decline to address these 
concerns.  See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) 
(observing that the constitutional avoidance canon “reflects the 
prudential concern that constitutional issues [need] not be 
needlessly confronted”).     
